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Solve worst-case Subset Sum faster than O*(2^{n/2}) — beat 50-year-old meet-in-the-middle

openImprove an algorithmconfidence: highverified 2026-08-10subset-summeet-in-the-middleexponential-timecryptographyaverage-case
Record
O(2^{n/2} · n^{-γ}) time, γ > 0.5023 (worst case — exponent n/2 unbeaten); ~O(2^{0.29n}) known only for random/average-case instances
Record held by
Horowitz & Sahni, JACM 1974; poly-factor shaving: Chen, Jin, Randolph & Servedio, APPROX/RANDOM 2023 (arXiv:2301.07134); average case: Becker, Coron & Joux, EUROCRYPT 2011
Hardness
no 2^{o(n)} algorithm unless ETH fails; no O(t^{1-eps} · 2^{o(n)}) algorithm (t = target) unless SETH fails
Hardness from
ETH: folklore via IPZ, JCSS 2001; SETH: Abboud, Bringmann, Hermelin & Shabtay, SODA 2019
Endgame
none known
Hypotheses
ETH, SETH
Problems
Subset Sum, Knapsack

Statement

Given n integers and a target t, decide whether some subset sums exactly to t, in worst-case time O(2^{(0.5-ε)n}) for some fixed ε > 0 — beating meet-in-the-middle. Randomized algorithms count. (A secondary open front: match the 2^{n/2} time with polynomial space.)

Current record

Horowitz and Sahni (JACM 1974) split the n items into two halves, enumerate the 2^{n/2} sums of each half, sort, and scan — O*(2^{n/2}) time and space, where O* hides polynomial factors. Fifty years later, no worst-case improvement in the exponent is known. The only worst-case time improvement at all is a polynomial factor: Chen, Jin, Randolph and Servedio (APPROX/RANDOM 2023, arXiv:2301.07134) gave an O(2^{n/2} · n^{-γ}) algorithm for a constant γ > 0.5023 in the word-RAM model, combining the representation method with bit-packing — the exponent n/2 is untouched. Schroeppel and Shamir (SICOMP 1981) reduced the space to O*(2^{n/4}) at the same time bound, and Nederlof and Węgrzycki (STOC 2021) pushed space below that benchmark to O(2^{0.246n}) — progress on space, none on time. The average case tells a different story: for random instances, the "representation technique" of Howgrave-Graham and Joux (EUROCRYPT 2010, ~2^{0.337n}) and Becker–Coron–Joux (EUROCRYPT 2011, ~2^{0.29n}) beats meet-in-the-middle soundly, which is why the worst-case barrier looks suspicious rather than fundamental. On the hardness side, Abboud, Bringmann, Hermelin and Shabtay (SODA 2019) proved SETH-based lower bounds in terms of the target t (no O(t^{1-ε} · 2^{o(n)})), but nothing known connects the 2^{n/2} exponent itself to any hypothesis.

Why it matters

Subset Sum is the simplest NP-complete problem — no graph, no clauses, just numbers — and 2^{n/2} is among the oldest unbeaten records in the field. The exponent is load-bearing in cryptography: knapsack-based cryptosystems and lattice attack subroutines are calibrated to it, and the representation-technique literature exists precisely because cryptanalysts pay for every hundredth in that exponent. A worst-case improvement would also propagate through exact algorithms that use meet-in-the-middle as a subroutine (Schroeppel–Shamir-style enumeration appears inside algorithms for knapsack, binary programming, and decoding).

Attack surface

(1) Derandomize the average case: the representation technique fails in the worst case because structured instances (e.g., all items sharing arithmetic structure) break the uniformity of partial-sum distributions; classify the obstructing instances — additive-combinatorics tools (Freiman-type structure theorems) are the natural weapon and this is explicitly proposed in the literature. (2) Instances with high additive energy are "compressible" and instances with low additive energy behave randomly; make that dichotomy algorithmic. (3) The Nederlof–Węgrzycki machinery (orthogonal-vector-style partitioning of the enumeration space) reduced space; investigate whether the same partitioning admits any time-space tradeoff below the 2^{n/2} time point.